Our well-informed readers are likely aware that on October 2, WeWork withheld interest payments due on five senior secured notes totaling approximately $95 million. In an 8-K report, WeWork stated that it has a 30-day grace period to make the payments before an event of default, that it has the liquidity to make the interest payments, and that it may decide to do so in the future. However, as an on the ground office leasing agent I believe that an important factor has been overlooked in the commentary on the payments that WeWork elected to withhold. That is the negative impact on tenant demand that will likely result from protracted negotiations with WeWork’s creditor constituencies.
WeWork also claims in the 8-K that “entering the grace period is intended to allow discussions with certain stakeholders in its capital structure to begin while also enhancing liquidity as the Company continues to take action to implement its strategic plan.” WeWork October 2, 2023 FORM 8-K. As a corollary, in an interview with the New York Times WeWork’s interim chief executive David Talley described the move as “typical” as a “precursor to a conversation.” New York Times article.
As always, I consulted Eric Haber who is general counsel of Wharton Property Advisors and an experienced bankruptcy attorney to solicit his views on the latest developments. He said that notwithstanding the benign characterization of the missed payments by management, there is now another major hurdle for WeWork to overcome. With the failure to make interest payments, it clearly appears that WeWork’s problems are expanding. It already was in an extended negotiation with its landlords to attempt to renegotiate leases and exit unprofitable locations, and now it has thrown down the gauntlet to noteholders.
WeWork is obviously trying to exercise its leverage on its major creditor constituencies by conveying the message that the failure to make concessions will result in a bankruptcy filing. However, there is only so much that a company that is running out of cash can do to renegotiate its major debt obligations outside of court. At some point, bankruptcy becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, and it may be better for WeWork to start lining up the necessary senior superpriority financing to fund a sale or reorganization in Chapter 11 now. This is the dilemma that WeWork’s board, including the newly retained directors with experience in reorganization proceedings must address.
Further exacerbating the problem, WeWork has undertaken multiple sets of negotiations with its landlords outside of bankruptcy over several years. But without meaningful progress, the exercise becomes futile absent new investment or an improvement in the underlying business.
This leads to a very important piece of the WeWork puzzle that has been overlooked by the commentators. I am hard-pressed to see how WeWork can possibly attract future tenants, known as members, to its spaces in its present condition. That is because many members are month to month tenants. Other members have leases for relatively short periods such as six months or a year. Until the present situation is sorted out, there is little incentive for members to sign new leases when they have no idea who those landlords will be, what the rent will be, whether their center will stay open and what will happen to their security deposit.
Accordingly, it is hard to see how new tenants or tenants whose leases are expiring can feel confident in entering into new leases until they have a better idea of what is going on at the company. In August, WeWork previously warned they could run out of cash in the next 12 months. Obviously, any drop in leasing activity will only make things worse.
Perhaps WeWork will successfully demonstrate sufficient progress in its negotiations with its landlords and noteholders that will impress prospective investors to provide additional funding. At present, that appears to be a tall order.